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Institutions and development: the interaction between trade
regime and political system
Abstract
This paper argues that an unequal distribution of political power, biased to landed elites and owners of
natural resources, in combination with openness to trade is a major obstacle to development of natural
resource- or land-abundant economies. We develop a two-sector general equilibrium model and show
that in an oligarchic society public investments conducive to industrialization - schooling for example -
are typically lower in an open than in a closed economy. Moreover, we find that, under openness to
trade, development is faster in a democratic system. We also endogenize the trade regime and
demonstrate that in a land-abundant economy the landed elite has an interest to support openness to
trade. We present historical evidence for Southern economies in the Americas that is consistent with our
theoretical results: resistance of landed elites to mass education, comparative advantages in primary
goods production in the 19th century globalization wave, and low primary school enrollment and
literacy rates.
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1 Introduction
One of the most fundamental facts regarding long run development in the last cen-
turies is the remarkable divergence between countries in per capita income levels. For
instance, Latin America as a whole had similar per capita income in the colonization
period between the 16th and 18th century as North America (i.e., the US and Canada)
(see Maddison, 2003, Tab. 4-1). Nowadays, per capita GDP of North America exceeds
that of Latin America by a factor of almost five. This divergence pattern is closely
related to the asymmetric evolution of industrialization in the Americas from the mid
19th century onwards (Bairoch, 1982).
Recent literature has stressed the role of political institutions for the relatively
dismal growth performance and slow industrialization of many natural resource- or
land-abundant regions like those in Latin America (e.g., Sokoloﬀ and Engerman, 2000;
Engerman and Sokoloﬀ, 2002). On a general level, the main argument is that the
distribution of political power aﬀects political institutions (e.g., the form of govern-
ment, voting rights legislation) which in turn determine economic institutions like the
education system, property rights legislation or the trade regime.1
This paper contributes to this literature by arguing that inequality of political
power in interaction with the trade regime determines the provision of education and
infrastructure, and thus its economic development. We develop a two-sector general
equilibrium model with a tax-financed public sector and show that in an oligarchic so-
ciety, which is dominated by landed elites, productivity-enhancing public investments
are typically lower in an open than in a closed economy. Our analysis suggests that
access to the world market destroys incentives of owners of land or other natural re-
sources to support reforms towards a better educated labor force in order to maintain
access to cheap labor. Under autarky, by contrast, they might support education for
1For a systematic outline of this framework, see Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2004). The
diﬀerence to standard growth theory is to endogenize the economic conditions for development by
political institutions which themselves are shaped by political power. For instance, several theoretical
studies have endogenized the level of property rights protection (e.g. Tornell, 1997; Gradstein, 2004).
For a comprehensive discussion of the role of property rights for economic development, see Rodrik,
Subramanian and Trebbi (2004). Seminal work on institutions and development was done by North
(1981).
1
promoting productivity in the manufacturing sector in order to dampen the price of
manufacturing products relative to the price of primary goods. Moreover, we find that,
under openness to trade, development is faster in a democratic system. In addition,
we show that lack of education is an impediment to structural change from the pri-
mary sector to manufacturing. This induces a negative feedback to industrialization
by preventing learning-by-doing eﬀects in manufacturing. Finally, we simultaneously
endogenize the second economic institution which aﬀects development in our model
along with the provision of public education: the trade regime. We demonstrate that
the oligarchic elite of a natural resource- or land-abundant economy supports openness
to trade (while at the same time opposing mass education), as a change in the trade
regime towards openness changes relative goods prices in favor of landowners.
These results suggest that an unequal distribution of political power, biased to
landed elites and owners of natural resources, in combination with openness to trade
is a major obstacle to development of natural resource- or land-abundant regions. As
argued in more detail at the end of the paper, one leading example in this respect
is the apparent failure of South America and the Caribbean to industrialize and to
implement an eﬀective schooling system at the time when the second phase of indus-
trial revolution took oﬀ in Western economies. The unequal distribution of economic
resources in these regions created a powerful class of big landowners (including owners
of mines).2 Consistent with our hypothesis, Southern economies in the Americas had
dramatically lower primary school enrollment and literacy rates compared to Western
economies well into the 20th century. In particular, we provide anecdotal evidence
which demonstrates the resistance of landed elites to implement reforms towards mass
education. Finally, we discuss evidence that - thanks to dramatically falling transport
costs and support by trade policy - commodity markets have become highly integrated
in the late 19th century, along with the second industrial wave. Consistent with our
theoretical model, Latin American economies have been major exporters of agricul-
tural goods and mineral resources, in turn importing manufacturing goods from the
2Landed elites in 19th century South America have not everywhere been farmers but made their
fortune from mining.
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European industrial core (e.g., O’Rourke, Taylor and Williamson, 1996; Williamson,
1998; Bértola and Williamson, 2003).
The proposed link of public policy to industrialization rests on two assumptions.
First, mass education in less developed countries cannot rely on individual incentives
alone. This hypothesis is at the core of recent theories on the link between inequality
and growth, initiated by Galor and Zeira (1993), which argues that borrowing con-
straints prevent individuals to invest optimally in education. Indeed, as pointed out
by Sokoloﬀ and Zolt (2004; p.22): “No society realized high levels of literacy without
public schools”. The crucial point for our analysis is that mass education requires
political support. For this support, the macroeconomic eﬀects of education are im-
portant, regardless of the question how education is financed. As will be shown, the
ruling class may oppose schooling even if it has not to pay taxes for them. Second,
while education was less important in the first industrial revolution (1760-1830), later
on, many forms of manufacturing production required at least primary schooling. For
instance, consistent with this hypothesis, Field (1979) provides evidence from a sam-
ple of 329 localities in Massachusetts in 1855 that both the share of merchants and
population density (which are proxies for the size of non-agricultural activity) greatly
aﬀected school attendance.3 Similarly, Nichols (1956) provides evidence on the impor-
tance of public school funding for industrial development in Tennessee.4 Bértola and
Williamson (2003, p.35) argue that, in contrast to North America, due to the failure to
adopt eﬀective public education policies, “Latin America was unprepared for the petro-
chemical industrial wave - the late 19th century ‘second’ industrial revolution - which
embodied more complex technologies, larger scale and higher skill requirements”. Also
consistent with the importance of human capital and public education in the second in-
dustrial phase, Galor and Moav (2003) discuss and provide overwhelming evidence for
3According to Field (1979, p.439f.), Massachusetts is particularly interesting because it “devel-
oped the nation’s first universal tax-supported public school system [and] was also the first state to
industrialize. [...] It is diﬃcult not to be struck by the coincidence of these two sets of development”.
4In a similar vein, evidence by Rosenberg and Trajtenberg (2001) suggests that the adoption of the
Corliss steam engine, a prime example of a general purpose technology in the late 19th century, not
only played a salient role in the industrialization process of the US but also was crucially aﬀected by
the regional availability of skill (as proxied by the number of books in public libraries and the number
of public libraries).
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their hypothesis that capitalists in 19th and early 20th century Western Europe were
successfully lobbying for massive educational reforms which greatly enhanced literacy
and enrollment in public schools.5
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses related literature. Section 3
presents the basic structure of the model. Section 4 derives the economic equilibrium.
Section 5 analyzes the political equilibrium regarding both public investment for a
given trade regime and the trade regime itself under both political systems, democracy
and oligarchy. Moreover, we examine the implications of the politico-economic equilib-
rium for structural change. Section 6 provides a dynamic version of the model which
incorporates productivity spillovers and learning-by-doing eﬀects of endogenous struc-
tural change towards manufacturing. Section 7 provides evidence for the Americas in
the nineteenth century in favor of our main hypotheses. The last section summarizes
and briefly discusses some implications for development policy today. All proofs are
relegated to an appendix.
2 Related Literature
There is now a substantial literature on divergence in per capita income across coun-
tries, and in particular on the apparent impediment of resource- and land-abundance
for industrialization in many countries.
Most closely related to the proposed relationship between land interests and education-
driven development is the politico-economic equilibrium analyzed by Galor, Moav and
Vollrath (2003) for a closed economy. In a diﬀerent approach to ours, they argue that
ultimately the accumulation of physical capital will give landowners incentives to sup-
port public education because of capital-skill complementarity. The point in time for
this to happen is adversely related to land inequality. In contrast, our analysis suggests
that openness to world trade has played a salient role for the incentives of the ruling
5Galor and Moav (2003) argue that the demise of the class struggle between capitalists and workers
in Western Europe can be led back to eventually coinciding interests with respect to public education,
induced by a gradual decline in the marginal productivity of physical capital as capital accumulated
during the first industrial wave.
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class of landed elites to block general education, in turn hindering industrialization.6
Galor and Mountford (2003) propose a purely economic mechanism (unrelated to po-
litical power) how trade may have contributed to growing income disparities across
countries. They argue that specialization of unskilled labor-abundant countries in pri-
mary goods production has led to a substantial delay in demographic transition to
lower birth rates, whereas industrial nations specialized in skill-intensive goods and
thus invested in education.
The evidence presented in section 7 focusses on the Americas at the time between
mid 19th to early 20th century. Insofar as the experience of resource-abundant countries
in the post-world-war II period resembles that of South America and the Caribbean
before world war I, our model is also related to the literature on the so-called “resource
curse” (for an overview, see e.g. Sachs andWarner, 2001). The fact that many resource-
abundant countries have grown slower than resource-poor ones in the last decades has
been attributed to a crowding-out of sectors which exhibit static or dynamic increasing
returns to scale (‘Dutch disease’)7 and to rent-seeking (e.g., Lane and Tornell, 1996;
Torvik, 2002) in economies with natural resources.8 In contrast, we focus on the eﬀect
of political institutions on development. Thus, our theoretical results are applicable
to the extent that many resource-abundant countries happen to have non-democratic
political structures. Interestingly, as predicted by our analysis, empirical evidence
6In a related paper by Gradstein and Justman (1997), typically, a democratic choice is favorable to
public education and growth as opposed to an elite society. Their closed economy, one-sector model is,
however, not designed to explain the interests of landed elites and does not refer to the role of the trade
regime. The role of political power has also been stressed by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001,
2002), who argue that European settlers introduced property rights protection in previously poor
economies, which has been favorable to future investments, whereas they expropriated resource- and
land-abundant regions. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) argue that a high settler mortality
rate in the 19th century discouraged settlements and thus has led colonizers to set up “extracting
states” while introducing property rights legislation in regions which have been more favorable to
settlement. See, however, Glaeser et al. (2004) for a critical discussion of this interpretation.
7See e.g. Matsuyama (1992) and Gylfason, Herbertson and Zoega (1999). Interestingly, as our
framework, the analysis of Matsuyama (1992) suggests that trade may be detrimental to development
in agricultural economies, although the mechanism is completely diﬀerent. In his model, an increase
in agricultural productivity may have a negative impact on growth (fueled by learning-by-doing in the
manufacturing sector) in a small open economy and is positively related to growth in autarky, when
the income elasticity of demand for the agricultural good is less than unitary.
8Rodríguez and Sachs (1999) provide an alternative theory. They show in a Ramsey economy with
natural resources that it can be optimal to overshoot the steady-state’s equilibrium consumption and
investment, such that growth rates are negative during the transition.
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by Gylfason (2001) suggests that a large proportion of the growth-retarding eﬀect of
natural capital works through reduced human capital formation.
Our analysis is limited, however, in two important respects. First, in contrast
to Galor and Weil (2000), Galor, Moav and Vollrath (2003) and Galor and Moav
(2003, 2004), we do not provide a unified growth theory in the sense of an endogenous
economic dynamic in which human capital accumulation arises as a consequence of prior
development processes, and becomes the engine of growth in later stages of development
(for a survey on unified growth theory, see Galor, 2005). Second, we do not attempt to
model a transition from an oligarchic to a democratic society. For instance, it has been
argued that democratization has been deliberately supported by the elites to avoid
social unrest and revolution (e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000, 2001) or to reap the
benefits from an educated labor force (Bourguignon and Verdier, 2000). In another
interesting paper, Bertocchi (2004) explains the emergence of democracies in Europe
during industrialization by relating the demise of the landed aristocracy to the growing
importance of capital. It replaced the indivisible landed estates in shaping the sectorial
structure and the distribution of wealth.9 Both strands of literature are complementary
to our approach and it would be desirable to extend our framework along these lines
in future research.
3 The Basic Model
Consider a two-sector economy (“agriculture” and “manufacturing”), producing two
consumption goods under perfect competition. The price of the agricultural good (X),
which may also be interpreted as some natural resource,10 is normalized to unity. The
9See also Boix and Stokes (2003), Cervellati, Fortunato and Sunde (2004) and Llavador and Oxoby
(2005) on endogenous transition of the political system from oligarchy to democracy.
10For instance, mining was the primary form of production in former Spanish colonies such as
Mexico with silver as the primary export in the 19th century. In contrast, other colonies like Jamaica,
Barbados, Cuba and Brazil primarily grew sugar, tobacco, coﬀee and other staple crops for the world
market. For concreteness, we will stick to the interpretation of the X−good as agricultural product in
our wording. Regarding an educated labor force the owners of big mining properties share the interests
of big landowners. They face the same wage cost and similar productivity eﬀects of schooling. Thus,
the impact on income from ownership of natural resources and land is alike. However, a caveat
remains. Mining products like copper or nitrate which were the primary export goods in Chile, for
6
price of the manufacturing good (Y ) is denoted by p. Under free trade, p is exogenously
given by the world market at p¯ ∈ R++.
There is a unit mass of individuals, of initially three types: big landlords, which
may also be viewed as owners of a large property containing natural resources, small
landlords and landless workers, indexed i = B, S,W , with fraction (and number) µB ∈
(0, 1), µS ∈ [0, 1 − µB) and µW = 1 − µB − µS, respectively. Each big landlord owns
an amount ρB of land, whereas a small landlord owns ρS < ρB of land. Thus, the
economy’s total land (or natural resource) endowment is given by R¯ = RB+RS, where
RB ≡ µBρB and RS ≡ µSρS.
Moreover, each individual holds a unit time endowment. (Individuals do not diﬀer
in abilities.) For simplicity, individuals have homothetic and identical preferences over
the two consumption goods, which can be represented by a linearly homogenous utility
function u(x, y) meeting the standard properties.11 Thus, the indirect utility function
of an individual with net income mi, denoted V i, can be written as
V i = g(p)mi, (1)
where g(·) is a strictly decreasing function.
Landowners can decide whether to produce the X−good or to become worker. This
captures the possibility of migration from land to the cities, i.e., urbanization and ex-
pansion of the manufacturing sector, which is an important feature of structural change.
If not working as farmer, an individual supplies its time endowment inelastically to a
perfect labor market. (We discuss producers of the X−good under the label “farm-
ers” without distinguishing between agriculture and natural resource extraction.) The
unit time endowment of active farmers is fully absorbed by supervising and organizing
production (and sales) at their land. If a landlord decides not to be active as farmer,
instance, do not enter the utility function as consumption good in our model. A full account of this
fact would require a model with intermediate goods production.
11Allowing for non-homothetic preferences, e.g., accounting for “Engel’s law”, does not aﬀect the
main insights from our analysis regarding the conflict between landed elites and workers on the pre-
ferred level of public investment (and the role of the trade regime), but makes the mechanisms less
transparent and considerably complicates the analysis.
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either this land is not used or another individual has to employ one unit of labor for
supervising agricultural production at this land. As will become apparent below, this
assumption simplifies the analysis by removing the land market from the model. In
Appendix B, we relax the assumption such that structural change goes along with a
selling of land by small to big landowners, and show that the insights of our analysis
remain unaﬀected.
Both sectors employ constant-returns-to-scale technologies. The X−good is pro-
duced with land and labor, which are perfect complements.12 Denoting dependent
labor input as li, a farmer of group i = B,S produces output xi according to the
production function
xi = AX min(ρi, li). (2)
The production technology for output Y in the manufacturing sector is given by
Y = AYLY , (3)
where LY denotes the fraction (and number) of workers in manufacturing. In order to
ensure that there are enough labor resources in the economy such that the manufac-
turing sector can be active even if all landlords choose to fully employ their land to
produce the X−good, we assume R¯+ µB + µS < 1, i.e., R¯ < µW = 1− µB − µS.
Productivity level AY , and possibly also AX , can be influenced by policy. In par-
ticular, we assume that they are functions of the level of public expenditure G, i.e.,
Aj = fj(G), j = X, Y. (4)
For instance, G can be interpreted as (per capita) spending on public (compulsory)
schooling or investment in public infrastructure. The former interpretation means that
(HY ≡)AYLY is the quantity of human capital (measured in eﬃciency units) in the
Y−sector.13 Suppose that fX(·) fulfills fX(0) > 0, f 0X(·) ≥ 0 and f 00X(·) ≤ 0. fY (·)
12This assumption not only simplifies the analysis considerably but is also plausible in view of the
limited substitution possibilites in traditional agricultural production.
13Productivity AX can then be thought of being determined by a spillover eﬀect from technological
8
is strictly increasing and strictly concave, and fulfills fY (0) > 0, lim
G→0
f 0Y (G) = ∞ and
lim
G→∞
f 0Y (G) = 0. It is plausible to assume, particularly with respect to educational
expenditure, that public investment G is more eﬀective in the manufacturing sector
than in the agricultural sector.14 Defining αj(G) := Gf 0j(G)/fj(G) as the elasticity of
productivity Aj with respect to G in sector j = X,Y , this means
αX(G) < αY (G). (A1)
Public spending is financed by taxes T i, i = B, S,W . The government budget is
balanced.
4 Economic Equilibrium
In equilibrium, each dependent worker must be indiﬀerent between working for a farmer
or working in the manufacturing sector. Thus, the wage rate paid by both sectors co-
incides; it is denoted by w. Moreover, production technology (2) and fixed supervising
requirements imply that either li = ρi or li = 0, i = B, S. Thus, the gross income level
of an active farmer i is given by15
I i = (AX − w)ρi = (fX(G)− w) ρi, i = B, S. (5)
Gross income of a dependent worker is given by w since workers inelastically supply
one unit of time to the labor market. Net income levels are given by
mi ≡ I i − T i, i = B,S,W. (6)
knowledge AY in manufacturing. Formally, such a spillover can be written as AX = F (AY ) =
F (fY (G)) ≡ fX(G), where the mapping F represents the spillover eﬀect.
14The assumption that the eﬀectiveness of an increase in G is larger in the manufacturing sector is
perhaps more debatable in the case of infrastructure provision like railways, which also promoted agri-
cultural or mining exports. So we prefer the public schooling interpretation, where primary schooling
is the relevant level of education in the considered historical context.
15A positive income of active farmers requires AX > w. This may require further restrictions on
(parameters of) the model, which will be made explicit in later footnotes.
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If mS > mW , a small farmer hires ρS units of labor. In contrast, if mS < mW , he
gives up his land and works either for a big landlord or in the manufacturing sector,
earning wage income w. In this case, he will not be able to sell the land at a positive
price (see, however, the modification of the model in Appendix B). To see this, note
that any landless individual using this land for agricultural production requires to earn
at least outside option mW , and an already active farmer has to hire somebody for
supervision at wage rate w. Since mS < mW ≤ w if a small farmer gives up his land,
employing this land does not pay for anybody, so its price will be zero. (Analogous
considerations hold for a big landlord.) Let wi, i = B, S, be the wage rates at which a
landowner of group i is indiﬀerent between working as farmer or as dependent worker;
formally, wi is given by (AX − wi)ρi − T i = wi − TW , according to (5) and (6). This
implies for the threshold values at which farmers give up land
wi =
TW − T i +AXρi
1 + ρi , i = B,S. (7)
If taxes are uniform, then wi = AXρi/(1+ρi).16 Allowing for non-uniform tax schedules
alters the result in a straightforward manner. If, say, T S > TW , then wS is smaller
than in the case of uniform taxes for any given level of AX . That is, small landlords
take into account that giving up their land would imply a more favorable tax treatment
and thus become dependent worker for a lower wage rate than if taxes were uniform.
As this straightforward eﬀect is not central to our main arguments, we can further
simplify the analysis by focussing on a uniform lump-sum tax. That is, we suppose
TB = TS = TW = G, (A2)
where the latter equation follows from the balanced budget assumption. Moreover, wi
is strictly increasing in ρi and positive under A2. Thus, 0 < wS < wB for all G ≥ 0.
Denoting the share of small and big landowners who are active as farmers by s and
b, we have in total bµB + sµS active farmers employing an amount Rˆ(s, b) ≡ bRB +
16Only the tax burden at wi matters. The shape of the tax schedules is irrelevant for the decision
of farmers to give up their land.
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sRS of both land and labor (which coincide under production technology (2)). Thus,
manufacturing employment is given by LY = 1− b(µB +RB)− s(µS +RS) ≡ LˆY (s, b).
(Note that LˆY (1, 1) = µW − R¯ > 0.)
Finally, note that profit maximization under perfect competition in the Y−sector
implies
w = pAY = pfY (G), (8)
according to (3). We are now ready to derive the equilibrium under autarky and in a
small open economy, respectively.
4.1 Autarky
This section examines the equilibrium outcomes under autarky and derives comparative-
static results with respect to an increase in public spending G.
Since preferences are homothetic, utility maximization implies that aggregate de-
mand for the manufacturing good relative to aggregate demand of the agricultural
good is a strictly decreasing function of p, and independent of any income variables.
Denote this function by D(p) and note that D0(·) < 0. In a goods market equilib-
rium, Y/X = D(p), where X = AXRˆ(s, b) is total output of the agricultural sector
and Y = AY LˆY (s, b) is manufacturing output. Consequently, the (relative) equilibrium
price p is given by
LˆY (s, b)ξ = D(p)Rˆ(s, b), (9)
where ξ ≡ AY /AX = fY (G)/fX(G) ≡ ξ˜(G). This defines p as a function p˜(G, s, b) with
the following properties. (All proofs are in Appendix A.)
Lemma 1. Under A1, p˜(G, s, b) is decreasing in G, and increasing in s and b.
Assumption A1 implies ξ˜0 > 0. An increase in G is more eﬀective in enhancing
productivity, and thus output, of the manufacturing sector. Hence, the relative price p
of the Y−good must decrease after an increase inG in order to restore the goods market
equilibrium. In fact, the required decrease in p (shifting demand towards the Y−good)
11
is less pronounced the higher the elasticity of substitution between the two goods,
ε(p) ≡ −pD0(p)/D(p). Moreover, p increases if production of the Y−good declines
and that of the X−good increases, which explains why ∂p˜/∂s > 0 and ∂p˜/∂b > 0.
Using (8) and p = p˜(G, s, b), we get for the wage rate:
w = p˜(G, s, b)fY (G) ≡ w˜(G, s, b). (10)
Lemma 2. ∂w˜(G, s, b)/∂G > (=, <)0 if and only if ε(p˜(G, s, b)) > (=, <)1 −
αX(G)/αY (G). Moreover, w˜(G, s, b) is increasing in s and b.
An increase in G has two opposing eﬀects on the wage rate w. On the one hand,
relative output price p declines under A1. This has a negative eﬀect on w. On the other
hand, productivity in the Y− sector is raised when G increases, which has a positive
eﬀect on w. The net eﬀect hinges on the relationship between the elasticity of relative
goods demand D(p) with respect to p, ε(p), and the relative elasticity of productivity
with respect to G in the two sectors, αX(G)/αY (G). If ε or αX/αY is high, then only a
small decrease in p is required to restore the equilibrium after an increase in G. Thus,
the productivity eﬀect of G dominates and the wage rate w rises with G. However, the
opposite may be true if both ε and αX/αY are low.
Example. If G is only eﬀective in the manufacturing sector (i.e., αX = 0), and
utility function u is Cobb-Douglas (i.e., ε = 1), an increase in G has no eﬀect on
w˜(·, s, b). In fact, u(x, y) = xχy1−χ, 0 < χ < 1, implies D(p) = (1− χ)/(χp), and thus,
w˜(·, s, b) = (1− χ)Rˆ(s, b)AX
χLˆY (s, b)
, (11)
according to (9) and (10). We will refer to this case of Cobb-Douglas utility with
AX = const. as Example in the following.17
17Note that in our Example, AX > w˜(G, 1, 1) (implying that gross income of farmers is positive)
requires χµW > R¯, as LˆY (1, 1) = µW − R¯ and Rˆ(1, 1) = R¯. (This also implies AX > w˜(G, 0, 1) since
w˜(G, s, b) is increasing in s, according to Lemma 2.)
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So far, the autarky equilibrium has been characterized for given fractions of active
farmers, b and s. Besides goods market clearing and labor market clearing, however,
in equilibrium, landlords must not have an incentive to deviate from their decisions
whether to become workers or to remain farmers. Diﬀerent occupational regimes may
result in equilibrium, depending on how many farmers give up their land and move
to manufacturing. The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium regimes in
autarky.
Proposition 1. (Autarky equilibrium). Under A2, sAUT , bAUT and wAUT =
w˜(G, s, b) are an autarky equilibrium if and only if one of the following conditions
hold:
(i) w˜(G, 1, 1) ≤ wS and sAUT = bAUT = 1.
(ii) w˜(G, sˆ, 1) = wS for 0 < sˆ < 1 and sAUT = sˆ, bAUT = 1.
(iii) wS ≤ w˜(G, 0, 1) ≤ wB and sAUT = 0, bAUT = 1.
(iv) w˜(G, 0, bˆ) = wB for 0 < bˆ < 1 and sAUT = 0, bAUT = bˆ.
Recall that wS and wB (with wS < wB) are the threshold wages (wi = AXρi/(1+ρi),
i = B, S) at which small and big landowners, respectively, are indiﬀerent of being
active as farmers or to become workers. Moreover, mS > (<)mW if w < (>)wS,
and analogously for big landowners, since increasing wage rates reduce income from
farming (through rising labor costs) and benefit workers. Note first that s > 0 implies
w˜(G, s, b) ≤ wS < wB and thus b = 1. That is, if ever, big landowners are the last
to become workers. Part (i) of Proposition 1 describes the case in which all landlords
remain farmers, as the wage is below threshold wS. In the case of part (ii), we have
an interior solution with some small landlords being farmers and others being workers.
To see that no other pair (s, b) 6= (sˆ, 1), 0 < sˆ < 1, can be an equilibrium, note
that at w < wS all landowners want to remain farmers, i.e., (s, b) = (1, 1), which is
inconsistent with presumption wS = w˜(G, sˆ, 1) < w˜(G, 1, 1). Similarly, if w > wS,
then s = 0, which is inconsistent with w˜(G, 0, 1) < w˜(G, sˆ, 1) = wS. Part (iii) refers
to the case in which the wage rate is in a medium range: high enough to induce small
landlords to withdraw from their land, but low enough for all big landowners to remain
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farmers. In case (iv), small landlords all become workers since w = wB > wS, whereas
a more or less large fraction of big landlords remain farmers. To see that this is the
only equilibrium when wB < w˜(G, 0, 1), note that any (s, b) 6= (0, bˆ) would require
w˜(G, 0, 1) ≤ wB, in contradiction to wB = w˜(G, 0, bˆ) < w˜(G, 0, 1). Finally, b = 0
cannot hold in autarky equilibrium, as this would imply that output of the X−good
is zero. Since the case that big landlords give up their land to become workers (b < 1)
is of no interest in our context anyway, we shall focus the analysis in the remainder of
the paper exclusively on b = 1.
Proposition 1 also shows that, in general, in case (ii) sAUT varies with G since
sˆ, defined by condition w˜(G, sˆ, 1) = wS, is a function of G. In an analogous way,
bˆ would be a function of G in case (iv) with bAUT < 1. However, in our Example,
these equilibrium values are independent of public investment G, i.e., an increase in
G can never induce structural change. To see this, note first that threshold wages
wi = AXρi/(1 + ρi), i = B, S, are constant if AX is constant. Second, according to
(11), also w˜(G, s, b) is independent of G. Thus, G doesn’t enter the criterion w˜ T wi
so that autarky equilibrium values, sAUT , bAUT and wAUT , depend on preferences, land
endowments and exogenous technological fundamentals only.
The political equilibrium will depend on how well diﬀerent agents fare under a
certain G−choice. For this, consider the indirect utility functions given by
V i = [(AX − w)ρi −G]g(p), i = B,S, (12)
V W = [w −G]g(p), (13)
according to assumption A2, (1), (5) and (6). Recalling g0(p) < 0, it follows that all
individuals gain from cheaper manufacturing goods (given w). The next result shows
that this unambiguously occurs in any autarky equilibrium when G increases.18
Corollary 1. (Relative price in autarky equilibrium). Under A1 and A2, autarky
18Moreover, if G is raised, active farmers may also gain from higher sales revenue, to the extent that
fX(G) is increasing. Finally, they benefit from an increase inG if wages decrease (i.e., if ε+αX/αY < 1,
according to Lemma 2), which of course would hurt workers. But also the opposite may hold, since
∂w˜(G, s, b)/∂G > 0, is possible.
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equilibrium price p˜AUT (G) ≡ p˜(G, sAUT , bAUT ) is decreasing in G.
Corollary 1 is important when comparing the autarky equilibrium with the equilib-
rium under openness, which is done next. This comparison will ultimately be the key
to gain insight in the analysis of the political equilibrium in section 4.
4.2 Small Open Economy
In a small open economy (SOE), we have p = p¯. Thus, domestic public policy cannot
benefit individuals by lowering the price p, contrary to the autarky regime. Moreover,
the wage rate under openness, wSOE = p¯AY = p¯fY (G), unambiguously increases in
G. In contrast, according to the analysis in the previous section, wAUT may increase
or decrease with G, or remains unaﬀected. Thus, workers may benefit more from an
increase in G under openness than in autarky since, under plausible conditions, the
wage eﬀect of an increase in G is higher under openness.19 (Obviously, it also holds
in our Example, where changes in G do not aﬀect autarky wages at all.) Thus, under
openness to trade, an increase inG gives rise to a distributional conflict between farmers
and dependent workers (compare (12) and (13)), which is not the typical case under
autarky.
The next result characterizes the occupational structure. It shows that in equi-
librium of a SOE, an increase in G does sooner or later lead to structural change
(whereas we saw that in autarky this possibly never happens). In the knife-edge case
that landowners are indiﬀerent between keeping the farm or becoming worker, we as-
sume that they are giving up their land.
Proposition 2. (Equilibrium in SOE). Let sSOE, bSOE denote the equilibrium
fractions of active landlords (small and big, respectively) under openness. Under A2:
(i) If p¯ξ˜(G) < ρS
1+ρS , then (sSOE, bSOE) = (1, 1).
(ii) If ρ
S
1+ρS ≤ p¯ξ˜(G) <
ρB
1+ρB , then (sSOE, bSOE) = (0, 1).
19Generally, (9) and (10) imply that ∂wSOE/∂G = p¯f 0Y > ∂w˜/∂G if (1 − αX/αY )/ε + p¯/p˜ > 1.
Thus, if sAUT and bAUT remain unchanged, an increase in G has a higher impact on the wage rate in
SOE if relative elasticity αX/αY or substitutability between goods, ε, are suﬃciently small.
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(iii) If p¯ξ˜(G) ≥ ρB
1+ρB , then (sSOE, bSOE) = (0, 0).
Since public investment is more eﬀective in raising manufacturing productivity un-
der A1, in SOE, farmers eventually will leave their land and become workers when G
rises.20
5 Political Equilibrium
The political equilibrium involves decisions in two dimensions: the choice of public
investment level G, and of the trade regime (autarky/openness). The equilibrium is
analyzed for two political systems, an “oligarchy” and a “democracy”.
Policy preferences of big landlords determine the political outcome in an oligarchy.
Under democracy, workers’ preferences are decisive. Policy preferences of small land-
lords are important to evaluate welfare consequences of political equilibria. As will
become apparent, the interests of small landowners under openness are in line with
either those of big landowners or those of workers, depending on the size of their land-
holdings, ρS. One can thus think of wealth requirements for voting participation as a
characteristic which distinguishes an oligarchic from a democratic system.21 A demo-
cratic system can be thought of one in which people with no or little land determine
the political equilibrium. In contrast, if wealth requirements are high, then the pivotal
voter is a big landlord, representing a landowner-dominated system.
For the role of the political system and of policy choices for economic development,
two channels are important. First, as the analysis of the economic equilibrium has
shown, public investments G in interaction with the trade regime determine to which
extent there is structural change. Second, the G−level determines productivity. In
section 6, we extend the model to a dynamic framework in which economic growth
is positively related to G. The main results from our basic (static) model remain
20Note that sSOE = bSOE = 0 is possible in SOE, since goods do not have to be produced domes-
tically in order to satisfy demand. However, as pointed out already in section 4.1, we shall not pay
attention to the implausible case b < 1 in the following.
21As will be discussed in section 7.1, wealth requirements for the assignment of voting rights were
prevalent and substantial in 19th century Latin America.
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qualitatively true.22 We will thus refer to a low level of G as an impediment for
development of the considered economy.
5.1 Public Investment in Political Equilibrium
Let GiSOE and G
i
AUT be the preferred levels of G of group i = B,S,W under openness
and under autarky, respectively. (For simplicity, we assume throughout that these
preferred levels are unique.)23 The following lemma characterizes policy preferences of
big landowners and workers with respect to G.
Lemma 3. Under A1 and A2.
(i) Suppose
f 0X(G) < 1/ρB + p¯f 0Y (G) for all G ≥ 0. (A3)
Then GBSOE = 0, whereas G
B
AUT > 0 is possible (and indeed prevails in the ‘Example’).
(ii) GWSOE = f
0
Y
−1(1/p¯) > 0. GWAUT > 0 is possible (and indeed prevails in the
‘Example’).
For an intuitive understanding of Lemma 3 it is useful to remember the charac-
terization of the economic equilibrium in the previous section. In SOE, the wage rate
wSOE = p¯fY (G) unambiguously rises with G due to enhanced productivity in the man-
ufacturing sector.24 Thus, if the impact of an increase in G on agricultural production
is small (assumption A3), big landlords lose more than they gain from an increase in
G. According to (12), even the motive to hold wages down alone could be enough for
big landowners to oppose education. (In absence of tax payments of farmers, condition
f 0X(·) < p¯f 0Y (·) would be suﬃcient for G = 0 to arise in oligarchy, which is somewhat
22In addition, the dynamic model allows us to analyze the development path of the economy, after
a change in the political system or in the trade regime, respectively.
23Note that our focus on b = 1 requires p¯ξ˜(GWSOE) < ρB/(1 + ρB) under openness and
p˜(GWAUT , 0, 1)ξ˜(GWAUT ) ≤ ρB/(1 + ρB) in autarky (i.e., the preferred investment level of workers is
such that big landlords remain farmers). The former condition follows from Proposition 2. The latter
condition is equivalent to w˜(G, 0, 1) ≤ wB, evaluated at G = GWAUT , and follows from Proposition 1.
24Note that, according to part (ii) of Lemma 3, condition AX > w (implying that gross income of
farmers is positive) holds in a democratic and open economy if AX > p¯fY (GWSOE) = p¯fY (f
0
Y
−1(1/p¯)).
This is fulfilled if AX is suﬃciently high and/or p¯ is low. Under these conditions also AX > p¯fY (0)
holds, which is relevant for an oligarchic and open economy.
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stronger than A3.) In contrast, workers in SOE simply face the trade-oﬀ between
higher wages and higher taxes, which is a well-defined problem leading to an interior
solution for GWSOE. Under autarky, all individuals benefit from a lower price of the
manufacturing good if G increases (Corollary 1), whereas p = p¯ in SOE. Moreover, as
argued in section 4.2, the wage eﬀect is typically smaller in autarky than under open-
ness. Thus, even big landowners may vote for a positive amount of G under autarky,
and unambiguously do so in our Example (in which wAUT is independent of G).
The next results show how the politico-economic equilibrium regarding public in-
vestment depends on the political system and the trade regime. We first ask how, given
the political system, changes in the trade regime aﬀect development.
Proposition 3. (Trade regime and development, conditional on political system).
Under A1-A3.
(i) In an oligarchy, if anything, public investment is higher under autarky than
under openness.
(ii) In democracy, the trade regime does not matter in a systematic way for devel-
opment; that is, GWSOE >,=, < G
W
AUT is possible.
Part (i) of Proposition 3 is an immediate consequence of part (i) of Lemma 3.
It suggests that openness to trade is typically an impediment for development in a
political system which is dominated by big landowners. In contrast, according to part
(ii) of Proposition 3, public investment resulting in a democracy may be higher under
openness than in autarky.
The following proposition shows how, given the trade regime, the political system
aﬀects development.
Proposition 4. (Political system and development, conditional on trade regime).
Under A1-A3.
(i) GWSOE > G
B
SOE = 0, i.e., under openness, public investment is higher in democ-
racy than in oligarchy.
(ii) Under autarky, the political system does not matter in a systematic way for
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development; that is, GBAUT >,=, < G
W
AUT is possible.
Part (i) of Proposition 4 shows that the political system plays a salient role for
development under openness. It suggests that under free trade development will be
faster in a democratic system compared to one dominated by landed elites. In contrast,
according to part (ii), the political system may not matter for development under
autarky.
We now turn to welfare consequences. Of course, big landlords are always better
oﬀ in oligarchy, in which they are pivotal for the political outcome, and workers benefit
from democracy. The next result characterizes the welfare eﬀects of the political system
for small landlords by examining their policy preferences.
Proposition 5. (Small landlords). Assume A1-A3.
(a) Under openness, (i) if p¯ξ˜(GWSOE) < ρS/(1 + ρS), welfare of small landlords
is maximized in oligarchy; (ii) if p¯ξ˜(0) > ρS/(1 + ρS), welfare of small landlords is
maximized in democracy; (iii) if p¯ξ˜(0) ≤ ρS/(1 + ρS) ≤ p¯ξ˜(GWSOE), welfare of small
landlords is maximized in oligarchy if fX(0)ρS+GWSOE ≥ p¯
£
fY (0)ρS + fY (GWSOE)
¤
and
in a democratic society otherwise.
(b) Under autarky, the political system does not matter in a systematic way for
welfare of small landlords.
<Figure 1>
Part (a) of Proposition 5 is illustrated in Fig. 1. Recall that GBSOE = 0. As long as
small landlords do not become workers (i.e., s = 1), their utility decreases gradually
with G. At G = ξ˜−1
¡
ρS/
£
p¯(1 + ρS)
¤¢
≡ Gˆ, small landlords are indiﬀerent between
being active as farmer or as dependent worker (see Proposition 2). Thus, for G > Gˆ
their utility coincides with that of landless workers. Now, if utility of small landlords
is higher at point A than at point B, then they prefer zero investment, whereas GWSOE
is optimal for them if vice versa. Also note that policy preferences of small landlords
are directly related to their landholding, ρS. If ρS is high, the interests of big and
small landlords coincide. That is, which group of landlords is pivotal doesn’t matter.
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What we call ‘oligarchy’ is thus consistent with a political system in which the wealth
requirement for voting participation is high. In contrast, if ρS is low, the interests of
small landlords coincide with those of workers. Thus, a democracy may be seen as
a political system in which workers or landowners with little land are pivotal (e.g.,
if wealth requirements for voting participation are low). Under autarky, according to
Proposition 5 (b), in a political system in which small landowners are pivotal, the
political equilibrium does not depend in a systematic way on their landholding ρS.
Proposition 5 is related to the decision of small landlords to be farmer or to be
employed as dependent worker. Suppose we start from an open economy with G = 0
and s = b = 1 before individuals vote over the level of public investment. We may
then ask how the likelihood of structural change under openness, i.e., a switch s = 1
to s = 0 (and thus from agricultural production to manufacturing), depends on the
political system.
Proposition 6. (Structural change in SOE). Under A1-A3. Suppose G = 0
and s = 1 initially. Then under openness, if anything, structural change occurs in
democracy but never in oligarchy.
Democracy in an open economy, because it leads to higher public investment than
in oligarchy, also is more likely to promote structural change. This has important long-
run implications. Structural change from agriculture to manufacturing production may
have positive feedback eﬀects upon the development process through learning-by-doing
in the manufacturing sector. They are worked out in the dynamic version of the model
in section 6.
5.2 Openness or Autarky in Political Equilibrium?
So far we have examined how education or infrastructure provision depends on the
interaction between the political system (oligarchic/democratic) and the trade regime
(openness/autarky). Now we also allow the trade regime, in addition to the level of
G, to be endogenously determined in political equilibrium (for either political system),
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i.e., we analyze a two-dimensional voting choice.
For examining the plausibility of an equilibrium in which openness is supported in
oligarchy, resulting in a low education − low productivity trap, we relate the politi-
cal equilibrium regarding the trade regime to the pattern of comparative advantage.
Comparative advantages are determined by the relationship between the autarky price
p˜AUT (G) for some G−level, and the world market price, p¯. If p˜AUT (G) > p¯, then the
considered economy has a comparative advantage with respect to the X−sector, which
is plausible for a land- or natural resource-abundant, developing country. We consider
first the trade regime in oligarchy.
Proposition 7. (Trade regime in oligarchy). Under A2 and A3, openness is sup-
ported in oligarchy if p˜AUT (GBAUT ) > p¯.
According to Proposition 7, big landowners prefer to have access to the world
market whenever the economy has a comparative advantage in the X−good. In this
case, the change in relative prices in favor of the X−good induced by a change in the
trade regime from autarky to open goods markets lets big landlords unambiguously
gain. Even if in autarky the wage rate would decrease with G (which would lower
production costs of landowners in terms of the X−good), switching to an open trade
regime with GBSOE = 0 unambiguously pays oﬀ for landlords due to a decrease in p. In
addition, there may be saving of taxes for public schooling provision.
Under democracy, the following holds.
Proposition 8. (Trade regime in democracy). Under A2, openness may or
may not be supported in a democracy. In particular, both outcomes are possible if
p˜AUT (G
W
AUT ) > p¯.
Proposition 8 shows that workers do not necessarily prefer openness to autarky,
although an open trade regime may be implemented in a democracy. This also applies
when the economy has a comparative advantage in the X−good, in contrast to the
unambiguous support of openness by landlords in the analogous situation (Proposition
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7). On the one hand, workers gain when p declines after a change in the trade regime
(as g0(p) < 0); however, on the other hand, wage rates may be depressed.
6 A Dynamic Framework
In this section, we extend our basic model to a dynamic framework in which public
investments and structural change are the engines of development. This allows us to
examine explicitly how the development path depends on the interaction between the
political system and the trade regime of the economy.
6.1 Structure of the Dynamic Economy
For convenience, suppose that individuals are infinitely living in continuous time. For
simplicity, we assume that there are no savings or storage possibilities. Lifetime-utility
of an individual from group i = B, S,W is then given by the present discounted value
of the stream of instantaneous utility V i(t) = g(p(t))mi(t) at time t ≥ 0, according to
(1), i.e.,
R∞
0
V i(t)e−βtdt, where β > 0 is the time preference rate.25 Again, we focus on
uniform lump-sum taxation under a balanced budget (each period) to finance public
investment (assumption A2).
The key assumption in this section is that productivity AY in the manufacturing
sector evolves over time according to26
A˙Y (t) = fY (G(t))AY (t)
γLY (t)
θ − δAY (t), (14)
where γ > 0 and θ > 0 give rise to intertemporal spillovers or learning-by-doing
eﬀects such that an increase in G leads to a higher productivity gain if the level of
25Alternatively, in a discrete-time model we could replace the infinite-life assumption by hypoth-
esizing non-overlapping generations, each living one period, in which life-time utility of a member i
of generation t is given by U it = V
i
t + βU it+1, 0 < β < 1, i.e., U it =
P∞
t=0 β
tV it . Results would be
unchanged compared to the continuous time version. An even simpler alternative, which however
does not allow to examine the development path but reproduces the results of our static version, is a
two-period model in which public investments made in period 1 pay oﬀ in terms of productivity gains
in period 2.
26(14) replaces (4) from the basic model for the Y−sector.
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productivity or the amount of labor employed in the manufacturing sector are high. If
θ = 0, then manufacturing employment, LY (t), has no impact on the future evolution
of productivity AY . If θ = γ, then A˙Y = fY (G)Y γ−δAY , which resembles the learning-
by-doing spillovers from output Y [= AYLY ] as modelled, e.g., by Matsuyama (1992).
However, we exclude the knife-edge case of balanced steady-state productivity growth
(which would occur if γ = 1), i.e., we assume γ ∈ (0, 1). δ ∈ (0, 1] is the depreciation
rate of productivity AY . (The function fY (G) has the same properties as in the basic
model.)
In the basic model, we assumed that public investment is less eﬀective in the
X−sector than in the Y− sector (assumption A1) and, for the analysis of the po-
litical equilibrium, focussed on the case in which the impact of a marginal increase in
G on AX is suﬃciently small (assumption A3). Here, we make our life simple by letting
AX be constant. Finally, suppose that the rest of the world is in its steady state, i.e.,
output price p is fixed at p¯ in SOE at all times.
6.2 Economic Equilibrium
Note from (9) that in autarky p is given by LˆY (s(t), b(t))AY (t) = D(p(t))Rˆ(s(t), b(t))AX ,
i.e., p is decreasing in AY . That is, output price p(t) falls as the economy develops
(driven by public investment), whereas the impact on the wage rate w(t) = p(t)AY (t)
is ambiguous.27 In contrast, under openness, since p(t) = p¯, w is unambiguously in-
creasing in AY .
The autarky equilibrium can be characterized by a straightforward modification
of Proposition 1. For simplicity, we shall focus however on the case of Cobb-Douglas
preferences in which the wage rate is fixed to the level in (11). As a consequence,
the fractions of active farmers, s, b, and thus LY = LˆY (s, b) are independent of the
public investment stream and AY in the closed economy. For the open trade regime,
Proposition 2 implies the following evolution of employment in the manufacturing
sector.
27w is increasing (decreasing) in AY if ε > (<)1.
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Corollary 2. (Evolution of LY (t)). Suppose A2 holds. Under openness,
LY (t) = Φ(AY (t)) ≡



LˆY (1, 1) ≡ LIY if AY (t) < AXρ
S
p¯(1+ρS) ,
LˆY (0, 1) ≡ LIIY if AXρ
S
p¯(1+ρS) ≤ AY (t) <
AXρB
p¯(1+ρB) ,
LˆY (0, 0) if AY (t) ≥ AXρ
B
p¯(1+ρB) .
(15)
Hence, under openness, there will be structural change when the economy develops,
where the state of development is measured by the productivity of the manufacturing
sector.28 That is, the economy may move from Regime I in early stages of development,
characterized by low manufacturing employment LIY , to Regime II in later stages of
development, with LIIY > L
I
Y . In turn, according to (14), this has a positive feedback
eﬀect on the evolution of productivity if θ > 0, for any given path of G(t).29 In a steady
state with G(t) = G∗ (steady state values are indicated by superscript (*) hereafter)
we have A˙Y = 0, and thus, LY (t) = L∗Y = Φ(A∗Y ), where (14) and (15) imply that A∗Y
is given by
A∗Y =
"
fY (G
∗) (L∗Y )
θ
δ
# 1
1−γ
≡ Ψ(G∗, L∗Y ) = Ψ(G∗,Φ(A∗Y )). (16)
6.3 Political Equilibrium
In the following politico-economic analysis, we focus on the two key questions of the
paper which address the slow development process of relatively open, land- or resource-
abundant, but politically unequal economies. First, how does the development path
under openness depend on the political system, and second, how does it depend on
the trade regime in oligarchy? That is, we analyze the qualitative eﬀects of a switch
from oligarchy to democracy under openness, and a switch of an oligarchic society from
openness to autarky.
28Introduction of a land market leads to a slight modification of (15) which however does not change
the results (see Appendix B).
29Irwin (2002) presents evidence which suggests that economic growth in the late 19th century was
crucially driven by structural change, i.e., by reductions in the share of agricultural employment. This
lends support to the accumulation equation (14).
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Suppose that, initially, the economy is in a steady state with G = 0 and s = b = 1,
i.e., AY (0) = Ψ(0, LIY ) ≡ ΨI0 > 0. Again, we focus on b = 1.30 Then, by virtue of the
assumption that policy preferences of big landlords determine the political equilibrium
in oligarchy, the following emerges.
Proposition 9. (Development path of SOE in oligarchy). Under A2, in political
equilibrium of an open and oligarchic economy, there is neither development nor struc-
tural change; that is, the economy gets stuck at (AY (t), G(t), LY (t)) = (ΨI0, 0, LIY ) for
all t ≥ 0.
As in the static version of the model, big landowners in an open economy have
no incentive to vote for an institutional reform, which would raise both wage cost and
taxes without aﬀecting output prices. Thus, the ruling class of big landowners prevents
both development and structural change under openness.
Next we consider the political equilibrium in democracy, which is determined by
policy preferences of workers. Using (13), workers maximize
Z ∞
0
[p¯AY (t)−G(t)] g(p¯)e−βtdt s.t. (14), (15), lim
T→∞
AY (T ) ≥ 0, (17)
and given AY (0) = ΨI0 and LY (0) = LIY . We obtain the following result.
Proposition 10. (Development path of SOE in democracy). Under A2, in political
equilibrium of an open and democratic economy, the development path has the following
properties.
(a) In any steady state equilibrium, G∗ > 0 and A∗Y =
³
fY (G
∗) (L∗Y )
θ /δ
´ 1
1−γ
> ΨI0
with L∗Y ≥ LIY .
(b) Initially, public investment jumps to G(0) > 0. If θ = 0, then for t > 0,
AY (t) and G(t) gradually increase along a saddle path towards a unique steady state
equilibrium. If θ > 0, then there may be a further jump in G(t), together with structural
30This means, in analogy to the basic model, that big landowners do not want to give up their land
at any time t under path G(t) chosen by policy.
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change. After this structural change, AY (t) and G(t) gradually increase along a saddle
path towards higher steady state values than without structural change.
Comparing Proposition 9 and 10, a democracy will always fare better under open-
ness than an oligarchy (as suggested by Proposition 4 in the static version of the model),
and - whenever there are learning-by-doing eﬀects from expansion of the manufacturing
workforce (θ > 0) - the more so if there is structural change.
<Figures 2, 3>
Fig. 2 depicts the phase diagram of the saddle path equilibrium adjustment to the
steady state in an open and democratic economy without structural change (e.g., for
θ = 0), whereas Fig. 3 shows a development path with both structural change through
learning-by-doing eﬀects from employment in the Y−sector. The figures illustrate that
under openness a switch from an oligarchy (stuck at ΨI0) to democracy starts a de-
velopment process fueled by continuous investments in public education/infrastructure
and, possibly, structural change.
We now examine the political equilibrium in a closed economy. It turns out that
the development path is qualitatively similar under both oligarchy and democracy if
we assume Cobb-Douglas utility.
Proposition 11. (Development path under autarky). Assume A2 and Cobb-
Douglas utility. In a closed economy political equilibrium under either political system,
initially, public investment jumps to G(0) > 0, and for t > 0, AY (t) gradually in-
creases and G(t) gradually decreases along a saddle path towards a unique steady state
equilibrium. The steady state is characterized by A∗Y > ΨI0, G∗ > 0 and L∗Y = LIY .
<Figure 4>
Comparing Proposition 9 and 11, an oligarchy experiences economic development
under autarky but not under openness (as suggested by Proposition 3). Moreover, a
closed democracy clearly fares better that an oligarchic system under an open trade
regime. Fig. 4 illustrates the transition of the economy to a steady state under either
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political system in the Cobb-Douglas example, with gradually increasing labor produc-
tivity in the manufacturing sector. In contrast to the development process in an open
and democratic economy (Proposition 10), there will never be structural change under
Cobb-Douglas utility.
7 Evidence: The Case of the Americas
As outlined in the introduction, available evidence strongly suggests that (at least pri-
mary) schooling was highly conducive to industrialization from the mid 19th century
onwards and significant educational attainment could never been reached without an
eﬀective public education system. This section provides historical evidence for the
Americas that, consistent with our theory, landed elites strongly opposed educational
reforms at least until the early 20th century, and that, as a result, primary school en-
rollment and literacy rates were extremely low in South America. Moreover, in support
of the proposed link of landed elites’ attitudes towards education and the pattern of
trade, we discuss evidence on the extensive trade relations between Latin America and
the European industrial core, where Latin America exported both agricultural goods
and natural resources, in turn importing manufacturing products.
7.1 Landed Oligarchy and Human Capital
The pervasive characteristic of the political structure in Latin America was that even
after independence the “landed aristocracy, all powerful in political and military af-
fairs, exerted also the decisive influence in economic aﬀairs” (Mosk, 1951; p.375). The
extreme political power in the hands of a small oligarchy had its roots in the highly
unequal distribution of landholding which has arisen from early European settlement31
and was sustained by political institutions like a lack of secrecy in balloting and wealth
and literacy requirements for voting (Sokoloﬀ and Engerman, 2000, Engerman, Haber
31For instance, still in 1910, only 2.4 percent of household heads in rural Mexico owned land, in
contrast to 74.5 percent in the US in 1900 and 87.1 percent in Canada in 1901 (Engerman and Sokoloﬀ,
2002; Tab. 6).
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and Sokoloﬀ, 2000; Engerman and Sokoloﬀ, 2002). As a result, voting participation
was extremely low. In contrast, the fairly equal distribution of land in North America
(with the exception of some Southern states in the US, with implications elaborated
upon below) has gone along with progressive democratic structures and considerably
higher voting participation compared to South America (e.g. Engerman and Sokoloﬀ,
2002).
Consistent with our hypothesis, this asymmetry in the Americas with respect to the
political structure was highly correlated with primary school enrollment and literacy
rates. Literacy rates in South American and the Caribbean have been (partly consider-
ably) below 25 percent around 1870. In contrast, literacy rates in the US have already
been 80 percent in 1870 and 82.5 percent in Canada 1861 (Engerman and Sokoloﬀ,
2002; Tab. 8).32 According to Easterlin (1981; Tab. 1), the population fraction in pri-
mary schools in the late 19th century have been around 2 percent in Brazil, 5 percent
in Mexico and even in fairly prosperous Argentina did not exceed 8 percent in 1900,33
in contrast to 19 percent in the US.
That said, one should be careful to point out that a substantial movement of “lib-
erals” has formed in the cities of late 19th century Latin America which, motivated by
the economic success and spread of free and universal education in Western economies,
strongly supported educational reforms. However, the landed elites quickly responded
to these demands by eﬀectively blocking these movements.
For instance, the federal government in Columbia published the “Organic Decree
of Public Primary Instruction” of November 1, 1870, as a first attempt to implement a
centralized primary education system, with obligatory schooling for all children aged 6-
14. This reform created a huge opposition. “Conservatives spoke out against the Decree
in a multitude of political and religious periodicals” (Loy, 1971, p.284) and eventually
32See also Coatsworth (1993) for a discussion of diﬀerences in both wealth inequality and public
schooling investments between Latin America and the US.
33Despite significant export-led growth, consistent with our theory, Argentina shared the common
experience of many agricultural economies at that time: “that integration into the world economy
at a rapid rate after 1870 had [...] failed to modernize the economic structures of Latin American
economies, that there had been growth but not development [...] and industrialization” (Stein and
Hunt, 1971, p.234).
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their opposition “contributed to the outbreak of the Civil War 1876-77” (Loy, 1971,
p.275). Even though there were attempts to revitalize schools in the aftermath, the
severe “drop in educational quality and in the number of public schools and students
caused even the reformers to express disillusionment” (Loy, 1971, p.292).34
Peru is another typical example in this respect. In the 19th century, Peru was
characterized by a caste-like stratification between mestizo landowners and Indians.
After lengthy debates and continued power struggles, a national education reform was
not established before 1905, and came into eﬀect only slowly. Consistent with our
result that, with access to the world market, big landowners oppose education even
if they would not have to pay taxes for it (see section 5.1), “local mestizo resistance
was suﬃcient to overwhelm most Indian attempts to form private schools [...] Indian
teachers were imprisoned and intimidated, as were those who would seek education.
As the Indian drive for instruction became stronger, school buildings were burned, and
an active propaganda campaign alleged that popular instruction was synonymous with
subversion and anarchy” (Hazan, 1978; p.428f.).
Even the prosperous British colonies in the West Indies like Jamaica were slow
to implement reforms towards mass education, although the British Colonial Oﬃce
started the promotion of schooling in 1870 (Sokoloﬀ and Zolt, 2004). However, the
class of Jamaican plantocrats strongly opposed the development of popular education.
Consistent with our hypothesis, Keith (1978, p.40) reports that landed elites in Jamaica
“felt it to be a potential negative force vis-á-vis their own interest in cheap, docile labor.
[...] The planters’ strategy was to keep a large mass of unskilled, potential workers on
reserve [...] rather than risk a system of popular schooling”. As a result, the majority
of Jamaicans remained illiterate until early 20th century, as was the case in Columbia
34The widespread acceptance of the desirability of universal primary education was not reached in
Latin America before the mid-20th century. Throughout the first half of the 20th century, “struggles
between liberals and conservatives continued with the conservatives loosely representing the interests
of the landed oligarchies” (Reimers, 2004, p.10). As a result, illiteracy rates in 1960 have still been 39
percent in Brazil, 55 percent in Honduras, and 35 percent in Mexico, down from 65, 67 and 77 percent
in 1900, respectively, whereas those countries with relatively low illiteracy rates in 1900 also saw the
largest drop until 1960: from 50 to 16 percent in Chile and from 53 to 9 percent in Argentina (Reimers,
2004, Tab. 6). This suggests that political power of landowners weakened. Another possibility is that
landowner interests have changed after the “globalization backlash” in the 20th century. According
to our model, in an oligarchic society mass education may find support if trade is restricted.
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and Peru.
According to Sokoloﬀ and Zolt (2004), the inability of governments to tax the
landed elites contributed to the severe lack of educational funding in South America.
As Centeno (1997, p.1578) points out: “Land rents never accounted for more than 3%
of total receipts” in Chile, and in Brazil, “taxes on wealth and production contributed
to less than 4% of ordinary revenue even during the war years”. A rather small share
of the modest tax revenue (mainly raised at the national level) was used for education
(most was expended for military purposes and internal security); in Chile, for instance,
only 5-10 percent of national government expenditure went into “public instruction”
from mid 19th to early 20th century (Sokoloﬀ and Zolt, 2004; Tab. 13).
In contrast, educational spending in the US was significant and mostly financed by
local property taxes (Sokoloﬀ and Zolt, 2004). However, interestingly, many writers
have pointed out that the attitude towards education in Southern plantation states,
with a powerful class of cotton producers, was much more similar to that in Latin
America than to the rest of the US, consistent with our hypothesis. According to North
(1961, pp.133-134), “the dominant planter class [...] could see little return to them in
investment in human capital. Expenditures to educate the large percentage of white
southerners who were outside the plantation system was something they vigorously
opposed”. Gerber (1991) shows that in late 19th century the average school days per
child in the plantation South of the US was less than half of what it has been in
Non-Southern states, and literacy rates were significantly lower. Consistent with our
hypothesis, his regression results indicate that “tenant farming was a significant and
important obstacle to the provision of resources to public education” (Gerber, 1991;
p.319). The resistance of landowners towards public schooling in the South is also
described by the following quote from a letter of the North Carolina state commissioner
to the US Commissioner of Education (1890, p.1079): “The opposition is intensified
by the belief that is more or less prevalent, that education spoils the colored people as
laborers to [...] the damage of the white people”.35
35Although the focus of our discussion is on the Southern New World economies, where the distribu-
tion of land and political power was extreme, it is worthwhile to point out that land interests have been
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7.2 Globalization in the 19th Century
The final step for underpinning our hypothesis is to provide historical evidence for the
access of landed elites to world markets and their support of an open trade regime
due to a comparative advantage in primary goods production. Indeed, until the early
20th century, commodity markets were well integrated, even from today’s perspective.
O’Rourke (2001) provides an excellent survey which highlights the significant drop in
transport costs and European tariﬀ-cutting from mid-19th century onwards (followed
by a “globalization backlash” in the early 20th century). With 9.7 percent, merchandise
exports as share of GDP in Latin America as a whole in 1870 was as high as in 1998
(Maddison, 2000, Tab. 3-2b). Latin America exclusively exported agricultural goods
like sugar, tobacco, coﬀee and other staple crops, and natural resources like silver or
gold, well into the 20th century (Blattman, Hwang and Williamson, 2003). Tab. 1
shows, for instance, that over two-thirds of Brazilian exports have been coﬀee between
1878 and 1938, whereas silver was Mexico’s major export in the late 19th century.
Columbia mainly exported coﬀee and tobacco. Peru’s export portfolio consisted to a
large part of sugar and silver in late 19th century.36
<Tables 1, 2>
North (1961, p. 126f.), in his essay on the economic structure of Southern US states,
documents for the first half of the 19th century “the rapid fall in ocean fright rates
an obstacle to mass education also in other parts of the world. For instance, Lindert (2004) argues
that the regional diﬀerences with respect to public education prevalent in the US have been similar in
19th century Prussia and other German states. Like in the US, local communities shaped and funded
the education system. According to Lindert (2004, p.120): “In 1876, funds from the Prussian state
accounted for only 8.9 percent of the budget on primary schools.” Consistent with landed interests
against education, public education evolved more favourably in urban areas and the least spending
on education in Prussia has been in the countryside in the east, dominated by the powerful Junkers.
36Although tariﬀs in Latin America have been comparatively high in the mid-19th century, and
did not decline for a prolonged period thereafter, de-industrialization fears (of emerging industrialists,
lobbying for protection) were entirely absent in 19th century Latin America (e.g., Coatsworth and
Williamson, 2002; Bértola and Williamson, 2003). Rather, Latin American tariﬀ policy in the 19th
century was primarily determined by wars and internal power struggles. Moreover, in view of a lack
of a functioning bureaucracy after independence, Centeno (1997; p.1587f.) states: “Custom taxes
represented an ideal solution to fiscal problems given the organizational ease with which they could
be collected. A few soldiers in the main ports could provide considerable income [...] Tariﬀs were
particularly attractive to the rural elite. [...] The fiscal use of trade thus contradicted any possibility
of protectionists economic policy”.
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on cotton to Liverpool [...] which improved the comparative advantage of cotton”. As
shown in Tab. 2, in the second half of the 19th century exports shares were substantial
in both Latin America and the European industrial core.37 Trade volumes were increas-
ing fast between 1870 and 1913. In 1913 export shares amounted to over 16 percent
in Germany, the Netherlands and the UK, 9.1 percent in Mexico and 9.8 percent in
Brazil. In addition, there is overwhelming evidence that the structure of trade has led
to factor price convergence between Latin America and the European industrial core
(e.g., O’Rourke, Taylor and Williamson, 1996; Williamson, 1998; O’Rourke, 2001).38
These facts are consistent with our hypothesis that landed elites in South America had
an incentive to support an open trade regime (Proposition 7) in order to profit from
export possibilities of primary commodities, in which Latin America had a compara-
tive advantage, and consumption opportunities from imports of manufacturing goods.39
Documenting the consumption pattern of landed elites in Latin America, Earle (2003)
points out that, “in late nineteenth century Brazil, for example, the São Paulo elite
spent the proceeds of their coﬀee plantations on [...] European luxury products. This
pattern was repeated across Latin America”. Orlove and Bauer (1997) provide details
on the expansion of imports during Chile’s belle époque. In particular, Chile’s imports
consisted of building materials and architectural design. Similarly, Langer (1997) pro-
vides insights into the significant consumption of high-quality European textiles in
Bolivia, e.g., among mestizo farmers.
37In contrast to Latin America, countries like Germany and the UK had a well-developed manu-
facturing sector already in the 1870s. According to Broadberry (1998, Tab. 5), the manufacturing
employment share was 33.5 percent in the UK 1871, and 24.7 percent in Germany 1875.
38Consistent with our framework, rising external terms of trade in Latin America went along with a
falling wage rate (for unskilled labor) and rising land returns. For instance, according to Williamson
(1998, Tab. 1), the wage/rental ratio dropped by an annual rate of 4 percent in Argentina between
1870 and 1910, and by 3 percent in the New World as a whole. In our model, the external terms of
trade are represented by 1/p, which rises as p drops from pAUT to p¯ after market integration. For a
given stage of development, reflected by manufacturing productivity, AY , this leads to a decrease in
the wage rate, w = pAY , and a rise in AX − w
£
= IB/ρB = IS/ρS
¤
which measures the land return
in our model.
39See Rogowski (1989) for a similar line of reasoning.
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8 Concluding Remarks
This paper has proposed a two-sector general equilibrium model with tax-financed
public education which addresses the long-standing debate of the comparatively slow
development in many land- or resource abundant economies like in South America or
the Caribbean, relative to a prospering North of what today is the US and Canada.
We provided a politico-economic analysis and historical evidence on land interests and
primary schooling which relates the divergence in development paths across the Amer-
icas to a failure to introduce or strengthen public education institutions in landowner-
dominated systems. As a new aspect, we brought the role of trade regimes into this
debate. We have argued that access to foreign manufacturing goods has been an im-
portant factor for the ruling class of big landowners to oppose productivity-enhancing
institutions like public schooling. This has been an impediment for both development
and structural change.40 Our analysis suggests that negligence of public education pro-
vision and the dismal growth performance in formerly colonized countries might have
been avoided under more restrictive trade constraints, and would not have occurred
under more democratic constitutions. Stronger trade restriction may have raised the
need to incur the costs of public investment for forming a productive labor force at
home also for landed oligarchs.
In contrast, the political preferences of workers (or people with little land) are in
favor of institutions which foster the development of the manufacturing sector. More-
over, our analysis suggests that an open and democratic economy is typically most
prone to structural change, compared to any alternative mix of the political system
and trade regime.
What are the political implications of our analysis for developing countries today?
Under the widely-accepted hypothesis that an eﬀective public schooling system is a
crucial factor for growth, first, it suggests that supporting democratization may be a
prerequisite for the development of countries with a large agricultural or natural re-
40In contrast, structural change in the US has been fast. The agricultural employment share in the
U.S. has declined from 50 percent in 1870 to 32 percent in 1910, 20.9 percent in 1930 and 11 percent
in 1950 (Broadberry, 1998, Tab. 5).
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source sector. Second, opening up an economy to goods trade without democratization
may be harmful for the development process.41
However, the second policy lesson should be treated with caution. We should em-
phasize that one has to distinguish clearly between openness to goods trade and other
forms of opening up the economy, e.g., to allow for factor mobility, foreign direct in-
vestment, and media-provided information, which are issues we have not studied here.
In fact, both capital and labor mobility may have the often stressed positive growth
eﬀects due to technology transfer and knowledge spillovers (in addition to raising ef-
ficiency by equalizing marginal products) also under an oligarchic political system.
Moreover, our focus was on the development process of economies through human
capital investments rather than the usual static gains from trade. One should also
note that, although openness may indeed have been an obstacle to growth in the 19th
century (e.g., O’Rourke, 2000; Clemens and Williamson, 2001; Vamvakidis, 2002),42
evidence for the late 20th century suggests the contrary (e.g., Harrison, 1995; Sachs
and Warner, 1995).43 In the context of our analysis this may mean that, contrary to a
more historical perspective, landowners are no longer the ruling class even in oligarchic
systems. Alternatively, the debate on the growth eﬀects of openness may be enriched
by our hypothesis that openness does not spur development in natural resource- or
land-abundant countries.
41There is no shortage of theoretical approaches which are consistent with a negative relationship
between openness and growth. These include, for instance, the infant-industry argument (e.g. Bard-
han, 1970) or explanations related to endogenous growth through technical change (e.g., Grossman
and Helpman, 1990; Young, 1991). In contrast, we have provided a politico-economic mechanism
which suggests that a systematically negative relationship between openness and growth occurs in
landowner-dominated elite societies only.
42In a sample of mostly European and New World economies, Vamvakidis (2002) finds that the
relationship between openness (as measured by various indicators) and growth is negative for the
time intervals 1870-1910 and 1920-1940, although statistically significant for the latter period only.
Focussing on a panel of ten, nowadays rich countries for the period 1875-1914, O’Rourke (2000)
provides evidence for a rather substantial positive relationship between tariﬀs and growth. In a
similar vein, Clemens and Williamson (2001) find that tariﬀs have promoted growth from the 1870s
until World War II.
43See, however, Yanikkaya (2003) for a modification of this result and Rodríguez and Rodrik (2001)
for a critical review of the literature.
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Appendix
A. Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. First, note that ξ˜0(G) = [αY (G)− αX(G)] ξ/G. Applying the
implicit function theorem to (9), and substituting ξ˜0, ∂p˜/∂G = [αY − αX ] ξLˆY /[GRˆD0].
Combining this with (9), we have
∂p˜(·)
∂G
G
p
=
αX(G)− αY (G)
ε(p) , (18)
where ε(p) = −pD0(p)/D(p) has been used. Since ε(p) > 0, ∂p˜(·)/∂G < 0, according
to assumption A1. Noting that LˆY (s, b) is decreasing and Rˆ(s, b) is increasing in both
s and b, the eﬀects of s and b on p˜(G, s, b) immediately follow from (9). ¥
Proof of Lemma 2. According to (10), (∂w˜/∂G)(G/w) = (∂p˜/∂G)(G/p) + αY .
After substitution of (18) the result is easily confirmed. ¥
Proof of Proposition 1. The arguments which prove Proposition 1 are outlined
in the main text. ¥
Proof of Corollary 1. According to Lemma 1, the result is obvious for cases
(i) and (iii) of Proposition 1. For cases (ii) and (iv), note that w˜(G, sˆ, 1) = wS and
w˜(G, 0, bˆ) = wB imply p˜(G, sˆ, 1)ξ˜(G) = ρS/(1 + ρS) and p˜(G, 0, bˆ)ξ˜(G) = ρB/(1 + ρB),
respectively. Since ξ˜0 > 0, p˜ must decrease with G in both cases. This proves that
p˜AUT (G) is declining in G within a given case. Now consider a switch between case
(i) and (ii). Choose G¯ so that w˜(G¯, 1, 1) = wS, i.e., p˜(G¯, 1, 1)ξ˜(G¯) = ρS/(1 + ρS) and
suppose that G is increased to G0 > G¯. If w˜(G0, 1, 1) < wS, then we stay in case (i)
with p˜(G0, 1, 1) < p˜(G¯, 1, 1), according to Lemma 1. If w˜(G0, 1, 1) > wS, then we switch
to (ii) with w˜(G0, sˆ, 1) = wS and thus p˜(G0, sˆ, 1)ξ˜(G0) = ρS/(1 + ρS) = p˜(G¯, 1, 1)ξ˜(G¯).
Since ξ˜(G0) > ξ˜(G¯), p˜(G0, sˆ, 1) < p˜(G¯, 1, 1). Analogous arguments apply for switches
between other cases. This concludes the proof. ¥
Proof of Proposition 2. Follows immediately from comparing wSOE = p¯fY (G)
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and threshold wages wi = AXρi/(1 + ρi), i = B, S, using ξ˜(G) = fY (G)/fX(G). ¥
Proof of Lemma 3. Part (i). Using w = p¯fY (G) and p = p¯ in (12), we have
GBSOE = argmax
G≥0
©£
(fX(G)− p¯fY (G)) ρB −G
¤
g(p¯)
ª
, (19)
implying the first-order condition f 0X(G)−p¯f 0Y (G) ≤ 1/ρB, with strict equality if G > 0.
Hence, if f 0X(G) < 1/ρB + p¯f 0Y (G) for all G (assumption A3), then GBSOE = 0. For the
autarky case, consider the Example: AX = const., u(x, y) = xχy1−χ. Then, wAUT is
independent of G in either scenario of Proposition 1. Moreover, it is easy to verify that
g(p) = Λ/p1−χ, where Λ ≡ χχ(1−χ)1−χ > 0. Using this and p = wAUT/fY (G) ≡ pAUT
in (12), we have
GBAUT = argmax
G≥0
V BAUT ≡
£
(AX − wAUT ) ρB −G
¤
Λ
µ
fY (G)
wAUT
¶1−χ
, (20)
and
∂V BAUT
∂G =
µ
−1 +
£
(AX − wAUT )ρB −G
¤
(1− χ)f
0
Y (G)
fY (G)
¶
(pAUT )
χ−1Λ. (21)
Thus, ∂V BAUT/∂G = 0 is equivalent to
£
(AX − wAUT )ρB −G
¤ f 0Y (G)
fY (G)
=
1
1− χ . (22)
Since the left-hand side of (22) decreases from infinity to zero as G increases, the
level of G implicitly defined by (22) is strictly positive. Moreover, (21) implies that
∂2V BAUT/∂G2 < 0 whenever ∂V BAUT/∂G = 0. Thus, GBAUT > 0. This confirms part (i).
To prove part (ii), first, note that GWSOE = argmax
G≥0
{[p¯fY (G)−G] g(p¯)}, according
to (13) with wSOE = p¯fY (G). The expression for GWSOE then immediately follows from
the corresponding first-order condition (also note that the second-order condition holds
since f 00Y < 0). To examine G
W
AUT , we again consider the Example, for which
GWAUT = argmax
G≥0
V WAUT ≡ [wAUT −G]Λ
µ
fY (G)
wAUT
¶1−χ
, (23)
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implying first-order condition
[wAUT −G]
f 0Y (G)
fY (G)
≤ 1
1− χ , (24)
with strict equality if G > 0. Like (22), this determines a unique GWAUT > 0. Moreover,
it is straightforward to check that ∂2V WAUT/∂G2
¯¯
G=GWAUT
< 0. ¥
Proof of Proposition 3. Part (i) immediately follows from part (i) of Lemma 3.
Evaluating (24) at GWSOE = f
0
Y
−1(1/p¯), we see that we can always find values of p¯ or
of the exogenous parameters determining wAUT by (11) so that GWSOE >,=, < G
W
AUT .
This confirms parts (ii). ¥
Proof of Proposition 4. Part (i) follows from Lemma 3. Regarding part (ii),
comparison of (22) and (24) reveals that GBAUT > G
W
AUT in the Example, since wAUT <
AXρB/(1 + ρB) = wB whenever big landlords are not inclined to become workers
(Proposition 1). To see that also GBAUT ≤ GWAUT is possible, suppose again Cobb-
Douglas utility but now assume f 0X(G) > 0. Also suppose, for instance, that G is
in a range such that (sAUT , bAUT ) = (1, 1), and thus, wAUT = z(1, 1)fX(G), where
z(s, b) ≡ (1 − χ)Rˆ(s, b)/[χLˆY (s, b)], according to (11). Then, according to (20) and
(23), respectively,
V iAUT =



£
fX(G)φi −G
¤
Λ
Ã
ξ˜(G)
z(1, 1)
!1−χ
 , i = B,W, (25)
where φB ≡ (1 − z(1, 1))ρB and φW ≡ z(1, 1). Suppose that V iAUT is strictly concave
in G for i = B,W , which holds under weak conditions.44 Thus, GBAUT < (=)G
W
AUT
if ∂V BAUT/∂G
¯¯
G=GWAUT
< (=)0. Using (25), GWAUT is given by first-order condition
(1−χ)ξ˜0/ξ = −
£
f 0X(G)φW − 1
¤
/
£
fX(G)φW −G
¤
. Substituting this into the expression
for ∂V BAUT/∂G, which can be calculated from (25), and noting that mB > mW requires
44A suﬃcient condition is ξ˜00 ≤ 0. Using definition ξ = fY /fX , it is easy to verify that ξ˜
00 ≤ 0
is equivalent to 2αX(αY − αX) + ηY αY − ηXαX ≥ 0, where ηj ≡ −Gf 00j /f 0j , j = X,Y . Observing
αY > αX (assumption A1), this holds, for instance, if ηX ≤ ηY .
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φB > φW , it is easy to show that ∂V BAUT/∂G
¯¯
G=GWAUT
< (=)0 if and only if αX(GWAUT ) >
(=)1. This concludes the proof. ¥
Proof of Proposition 5. Part (a). To prove part (i), recall from Proposition
2, part (i), that p¯ξ˜(GWSOE) < ρS/(1 + ρS) implies that small landlords do not want
to become workers at G = GWSOE under openness. If they are active as farmers, they
prefer G = 0 if f 0X(G)− p¯f 0Y (G) < 1/ρS for all G ≥ 0, according to (12). Since ρB > ρS,
this always holds under A3. Also note that ξ˜0(G) > 0 under A1, i.e., ξ˜(0) < ξ˜(GWSOE).
Thus, p¯ξ˜(0) < ρS/(1 + ρS); that is, small landlords are indeed farmers at G = 0. This
confirms part (i).
If p¯ξ˜(0) > ρS/(1 + ρS), then, according to Proposition 2, part (ii), small landlords
want to become workers at both G = 0 and G = GWSOE, which confirms part (ii).
Under the presumption of part (iii), small landlords are farmers if G = 0 and
become workers if G = GWSOE, according to Proposition 2. Thus, they prefer G = 0 iﬀ
(fX(0)− p¯fY (0)) ρSg(p¯) ≥
£
p¯fY (G
W
SOE)−GWSOE
¤
g(p¯), and prefer G = GWSOE otherwise,
where the left-hand side of the preceding inequality equals the maximum utility which
can be obtained as farmer (recall that assumption A3 implies (f 0X(G)− p¯f 0Y (G)) ρS <
1 for all G ≥ 0), and the right-hand side the one which can be obtained as worker.
Rearranging terms confirms part (iii).
Part (b). First, note that under autarky the interests of workers and small landlords
coincide if s < 1. Thus, small landlords can never lose in this case when the political
system is switching from oligarchy (with GBAUT ) to democracy (with G
W
AUT ) as long as
s < 1. For s = 1, however, as GBAUT >,=, < G
W
AUT is possible (Proposition 4), it is
unclear whether small landlords gain or lose from a switch of the political system. ¥
Proof of Proposition 6. Suppose p¯ξ˜(0) ≤ ρS/(1 + ρS) < p¯ξ˜(GWSOE), where
GWSOE = f
0
Y
−1(1/p¯). According to Proposition 2, sSOE = 1 if G = 0, whereas sSOE = 0
if G = GWSOE. This implies that the economy switches to sSOE = 0 in democracy,
if starting from G = 0 before voting takes place. In contrast, since GBSOE = 0, the
economy always gets stuck in sSOE = 1 in oligarchy. ¥
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Proof of Proposition 7. First, recall that GBSOE = 0. Thus, according to (12),
the ruling class of landlords is worse oﬀ (better oﬀ) in autarky compared to free trade
iﬀ
fX(G
B
AUT )− pAUTfY (GBAUT ) < (>) (fX (0)− p¯fY (0))
g(p¯)
g(pAUT )
+
GBAUT
ρB , (26)
where pAUT = p˜AUT (GBAUT ). First, suppose G
B
AUT > 0. According to assumption A3,
f 0X(G)− p¯f 0Y (G) < 1/ρB for all G ≥ 0. Taking integrals of both sides of this inequality
with respect to G from 0 to GBAUT yields
fX(G
B
AUT )− p¯fY (GBAUT ) < fX (0)− p¯fY (0) +
GBAUT
ρB . (27)
Inequality (27) together with pAUT > p¯ and thus g(pAUT ) < g(p¯) (since g0(·) < 0) imply
that the left-hand side of (26) is strictly smaller than the right-hand side of (26). For
GBAUT = 0, the result immediately follows from (26). This concludes the proof. ¥
Proof of Proposition 8. Using (13), workers are worse oﬀ (better oﬀ) in autarky
compared to free trade iﬀ
Q(p¯) ≡
£
p¯fY (G
W
SOE)−GWSOE
¤
g(p¯) > (<)
£
wAUT −GWAUT
¤
g(pAUT ), (28)
where pAUT = p˜AUT (GWAUT ) andwAUT = w˜AUT (G
W
AUT ). (Also recallG
W
SOE = (f
0
Y )
−1(1/p¯).)
It suﬃces to look at our Example, in which g(p) = Λ/p1−χ. Using this, we next show
that there always exists a p¯ ∈ R++ such that both sides of (28) are equal. To see this,
first, note that the right-hand side of (28) is strictly positive, according to (24) and
GWAUT > 0. Second, using the facts that p¯f
0
Y (G
W
SOE) = 1 and g(p) = Λ/p1−χ, we obtain
that Q0(p¯) = Λ[χp¯fY (·) + (1 − χ)GWSOE]/p¯2−χ > 0. Third, by employing L’Hôpital’s
rule, we find that
lim
p¯→0
Q(p¯) =
Λlim
p¯→0
fY (G
W
SOE)
(1− χ)lim
p¯→0
p−χ
= 0 (29)
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and, observing that lim
p¯→∞
GWSOE →∞,
lim
p¯→∞
Q(p¯) =
Λ lim
p¯→∞
fY (G
W
SOE)
(1− χ) lim
p¯→∞
p−χ
→∞. (30)
This confirms that there exists a p¯ ∈ R++ such that (28) holds with equality. Denote
this level by p¯AUT . Since Q0(p¯) > 0, we find that openness (autarky) is preferred if
p¯ > (<)p¯AUT . Moreover, since lim
p¯→0
Q(p¯) = 0, it is obvious that there exists a p¯ such
that p¯ < p¯AUT and p¯ < pAUT [= p˜AUT (GWAUT )], which proves that workers may prefer
autarky if p¯ < pAUT .
Finally, we need to show that also openness is possibly preferred if p¯ < pAUT .
The following specifications in our Example suﬃce. Let fY (G) = 1 + G1/2, χ = 0.5
(i.e., g(p) = 0.5/
√
p), wAUT = 1.25, and p¯ = 1. Then, using p¯f 0Y (G
W
SOE) = 1, we
have GWSOE = 0.25, and Q(1) = 0.625. Moreover, using that G
W
AUT is given by (24),
holding with equality, and denoting c =
p
GWAUT , we obtain after rearranging terms
that c is given by c2 + 0.8c − 0.25 = 0, i.e., c = (
√
41 − 4)/10 ≈ 0.24. Thus, pAUT =
wAUT/fY (G
W
AUT ) = 1.25/(1 + c) > 1[= p¯]. Moreover, since the utility level of workers
under autarky is given by [wAUT − GWAUT ]g(pAUT ) = [1.25− c2] 0.5(pAUT )−1/2, we find
that utility under autarky becomes [1.25− c2]
√
1 + c/
√
5 ≈ 0.59, which is below the
utility level of workers under openness, 0.625[= Q(1)]. This concludes the proof. ¥
Proof of Corollary 2. Follows from Proposition 2, by replacing ξ˜(G) by AY (t)/AX
and observing LY = LˆY (sSOE, bSOE). ¥
Proof of Proposition 9. Big landlords maximize
Z ∞
0
£
(AX − p¯AY (t)) ρB −G(t)
¤
g(p¯)e−βtdt s.t. (14), (15) and lim
T→∞
AY (T ) ≥ 0, (31)
given AY (0) = ΨI0 and LY (0) = LIY . It is thus obvious that they lose from any
increase of productivity AY , be it directly from public investment or indirectly through
structural change. ¥
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Proof of Proposition 10. To prove the result, we first derive the dynamical
system arising under openness in democracy. We first neglect the evolution of LY con-
ditional on AY , indicated by (15). Note that with our focus on b = 1, LY ∈ {LIY , LIIY }.
The current-value Hamiltonian function for the utility maximization problem (17),
HWSOE, reads
HWSOE = [p¯AY −G] g(p¯) + λ
£
fY (G) (AY )
γ (LY )
θ − δAY
¤
, (32)
where λ is the current-value co-state variable associated with (14). The first-order
conditions with respect to control variable G and state variable AY are given by
∂HWSOE/∂G = 0 and −∂HWSOE/∂AY = λ˙− βλ, respectively, i.e., we have45
λ = g(p¯)
f 0Y (G) (AY )
γ (LY )θ
=⇒ λ˙λ = ηY (G)
G˙
G
− γ A˙Y
AY
, (33)
where ηY (G) ≡ −f 00Y (G)G/f 0Y (G) > 0, and
λ˙
λ = β + δ − γfY (G) (AY )
γ−1 (LY )
θ − p¯g(p¯)λ . (34)
Substituting the expressions for λ and λ˙/λ from (33) into (34), using A˙Y /AY =
fY (G) (AY )
γ−1 (LY )
θ − δ from (14), and rearranging terms, we get
G˙
G
=
β + δ(1− γ)− p¯f 0Y (G) (AY )
γ (LY )
θ
ηY (G)
. (35)
We are now ready to prove part (a). Substituting (16) into (35), setting G˙ = 0 and
rearranging terms, we obtain the following implicit characterization of steady state
value G∗:
p¯f 0Y (G
∗)
µ
fY (G
∗)
δ
¶ γ
1−γ
(LY )
θ
1−γ = β + δ(1− γ) > 0. (36)
45The transversality condition associated with constraint lim
T→∞
AY (T ) ≥ 0 reads
lim
T→∞
e−βTλ(T )AY (T ) = 0, which can be rewritten as lim
T→∞
e−βTAY (T )
1−γ/f 0Y (G(T )) = 0, ac-
cording to (33). Thus, if lim
T→∞
AY (T ) = const. and lim
T→∞
G(T ) = const., it becomes lim
T→∞
e−βT = 0,
i.e., for any steady state the transversality condition holds.
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Thus, since lim
G→0
f 0Y (G) = ∞ and lim
G→∞
f 0Y (G) = 0, given LY ∈ {LIY , LIIY }, we have
0 < G∗ < ∞ for any G∗ satisfying (36).46 In turn, since LIY < LIIY , this implies
A∗Y =
³
fY (G
∗) (L∗Y )
θ /δ
´ 1
1−γ
>
¡
fY (0)(L
I
Y )
θ/δ
¢ 1
1−γ = ΨI0. This confirms part (i).47
For part (b), note that ∂A˙Y /∂G > 0, according to (14). Also note that, for given
LY , ∂G˙/∂AY < 0, according to (35). We now turn to the A˙Y = 0 and G˙ = 0 loci in
AY − G−space. From (14), it is easy to check that the A˙Y = 0 locus has a finite and
strictly positive slope. Moreover, note that G˙ = 0 implies the relationship
p¯f 0Y (G) =
β + δ(1− γ)
(AY )
γ (LY )θ
. (37)
Thus, observing the boundary conditions of f 0Y and LY = Φ(AY ) ∈ {LIY , LIIY }, we have
G > 0 for any AY > 0 at the G˙ = 0 locus. Moreover, given LY ,
∂G
∂AY
¯¯¯¯
G˙=0
= − γ [β + δ(1− γ)]
p¯f 00Y (G)(LY )θ (AY )
γ+1 > 0. (38)
Together with ∂A˙Y /∂G > 0, ∂G˙/∂AY < 0 and the fact that G > 0 for any AY > 0 at
the G˙ = 0 locus, public investment initially jumps to G(0) > 0, and the development
path conditional on the employment regime (i.e., given LY ) is a saddle path, as shown in
Fig. 2. Now recall that AY (0) = ΨI0. Thus, if θ = 0, A∗Y and G∗ are independent of LY ,
and the steady state of the political equilibrium is characterized by the minimum levels
of (A∗Y , G
∗) which solve (16) and (36), i.e., the dynamical system converges to a unique
steady state equilibrium. If θ > 0, gradual productivity increases may ultimately imply
a switch from Regime I to II, according to Corollary 2, and thus may lead to a jump
in G. It remains to be shown that structural change boosts both A∗Y and G
∗. To see
this, note that an increase in LY , associated with structural change from Regime I to
II, shifts the A˙Y = 0 locus (which is given by fY (G) (LY )
θ = δ (AY )1−γ, according to
46Due to the boundary conditions of f 0Y , existence of a steady state equilibrium is ensured for θ = 0.
47A steady state equilibrium can be defined as a pair (A∗Y , G
∗) which solves
p¯f 0Y (G
∗) (fY (G
∗)/δ)
γ
1−γ Φ(A∗Y )
θ
1−γ = β + δ(1− γ) and A∗Y =
£
fY (G
∗)Φ(A∗Y )θ/δ
¤ 1
1−γ ,
according to (15), (16) and (36).
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(14)) downward and, according to (37), the G˙ = 0 locus upward (see Fig. 3). This
concludes the proof of part (b). ¥
Proof of Proposition 11. Recall that initially the economy is in Regime I.
Moreover, with Cobb-Douglas utility, w(t) = (1− χ)R¯AX/[χLIY ] ≡ wI is independent
of AY under autarky, according to (11), and thus, time-independent. Thus, irrespective
of the decisions of the pivotal class (of big landowners or workers, respectively), the
economy is always in Regime I. Let us start with an oligarchic system. According to
(12), big landlords maximize
Z ∞
0
£¡
AX − wI
¢
ρB −G(t)
¤
g(p(t))e−βtdt s.t. (14), (15), lim
T→∞
AY (T ) ≥ 0, (39)
given AY (0) = ΨI0 and, for all t, LY (t) = LIY . Recall that g(p) = Λ/p1−χ in the
Cobb-Douglas case. Moreover, p(t) = wI/AY (t). Thus, the current-value Hamiltonian
function for the utility maximization problem (39), HBAUT , can be written as48
HBAUT =
£¡
AX − wI
¢
ρB −G
¤
(AY )
1−χΘ+ λ
£
fY (G) (AY )
γ (LY )
θ − δAY
¤
, (40)
where Θ ≡ Λ
£
(1− χ)R¯AX/(χLIY )
¤χ−1
> 0. The first-order conditions ∂HBAUT/∂G = 0
and −∂HBAUT/∂AY = λ˙− βλ imply
λ = Θ(AY )
1−χ−γ
f 0Y (G)(LY )θ
=⇒ λ˙λ = ηY (G)
G˙
G
+ (1− χ− γ)A˙Y
AY
(41)
(recalling ηY (G) = −f 00Y (G)G/f 0Y (G)), and
λ˙
λ = β + δ − γfY (G) (AY )
γ−1 (LY )
θ −
(1− χ)Θ
£¡
AX − wI
¢
ρB −G
¤
(AY )
1−χ
λ . (42)
48Again, λ is the current-value co-state variable associated with (14). Moreover, it can again be
shown that the transversality condition holds.
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Combining (41), (42) and (14), and rearranging terms, we obtain
G˙
G
=
β + δ(2− χ− γ)− (1− χ)(AY )γ−1(LY )θ
££¡
AX − wI
¢
ρB −G
¤
f 0Y (G) + fY (G)
¤
ηY (G)
.
(43)
Thus, ∂G˙/∂AY > 0 (recall γ < 1), and G˙ = 0 implies
(AY )
γ−1 ££¡AX − wI¢ ρB −G¤ f 0Y (G) + fY (G)¤ = β + δ(2− χ− γ)(1− χ)(LY )θ . (44)
We find
∂G
∂AY
¯¯¯¯
G˙=0
=
(1− γ)
h
f 0Y (G) +
fY (G)
(AX−wI)ρB−G
i
f 00Y (G)AY
< 0. (45)
Moreover, combining (A∗Y )
1−γ = fY (G
∗) (L∗Y )
θ /δ from (16) with (44),
£¡
AX − wI
¢
ρB −G∗
¤
f 0Y (G
∗)
fY (G∗)
+ 1 =
δ
1− χ [β + δ(2− χ− γ)] . (46)
Since the left hand side of (46) is strictly decreasing from infinity to approaching zero,
we have G∗ > 0. In sum, preceding results give rise to the phase diagram in Fig. 4.
For the political equilibrium in a closed democracy, just replace the gross income
of big landowners in Regime I,
¡
AX − wI
¢
ρB, with the wage rate wI (i.e., the income
of workers in Regime I) everywhere (compare (12) and (13)), which reveals that the
dynamical system under autarky is qualitatively similar in either political system. This
concludes the proof. ¥
B. Introducing a Land Market
In the main text, our assumptions endogenously removed transactions of land from
the model when structural change occurred. Small landlords left their land idle when
becoming a worker. In this appendix, we extend our framework by introducing a land
market in the analysis.
The key modification is to relax the following two assumptions: first, that small
landlords have to devote their entire unit time endowment to supervise production,
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and second, that the supervising capacity of big landowners is limited to the initially
possessed land. Formally, this is captured by modifying the technology available for
small landlords to
xS = ASX min(ρS, lS) + a. (47)
where the term a > 0 (which may be a function of ρS) indicates that a small landlord
is productive on his land apart from supervising, ASX ≥ 0. ASX = 0 implies that he
does not employ dependent workers. The technology of big landlords still has the
form xB = ABX min(ρB, lB), where, possibly, ABX 6= ASX .49 However, in contrast to
the assumption in the main text, they can supervise work at additional land without
hiring a supervising agent. Let π denote the price per unit of land and suppose ASX > 0
first. Then a small landlord is willing to sell his land and become worker if w+ πρS ≥
(ASX − w)ρS + a, which is equivalent to π ≥ ASX +
£
a− w(1 + ρS)
¤
/ρS ≡ πS. πS is
a small landlord’s “willingness to accept” a buy oﬀer. The “willingness to pay” of
big landlords for a unit of land is given by πB ≡ ABX − w
£
= IB/ρB
¤
. Thus, small
landowners are both willing and able to sell their land to big landowners whenever
πS ≤ π ≤ πB. Note that πS ≤ πB is equivalent to w ≥ a − ρS(ABX − ASX) ≡ w¯.
If w¯ ≤ 0, then land is sold immediately at some price between πS and πB, so small
landlords would disappear from the model. Suppose w¯ > 0, i.e., the average land
productivity in small farms must exceed that of big farmers for this land, e.g., because
of particular eﬀort a small landowner exerts. Moreover, we have to ensure that the
resulting equilibrium land price, ABX − w¯, is positive. In sum, 0 < w¯ < ABX , which
requires ABX < A
S
X + a/ρS < ABX(1 + 1/ρS). If ASX = 0, a similar logic applies. It
is easy to show that, in this case, the willingness to accept for a small landowner is
πS = (a − w)/ρS. If ABX ≥ a/ρS, then πS ≤ πB for any w and small landowners
disappear from the model. Suppose ABX < a/ρS. Then, for any w, πS > πB if ρS ≥ 1.
No land market can arise in this case. For ρS < 1, w¯ = (a − ρSABX)/(1 − ρS), and
0 < w¯ < ABX if a < A
B
X < a/ρS.
49Allowing for ABX > A
S
X captures, for instance, that big landlords, which may be thought of early
settlers in the New World economies, had access to more fertile land or, due to size advantages, were
able to exploit scale economies (Sokoloﬀ and Engerman, 2000; Engerman and Sokoloﬀ, 2002).
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We focus on the specifications of the dynamic model, i.e., productivity parameters
ABX and A
S
X are constants and utility is Cobb-Douglas. Thus, under autarky, w is
independent of the stage of development, so either land is sold in the initial period at
price ABX − w¯ or structural change never occurs. In contrast, under openness, no land
is sold (sSOE = 1) as long as w < w¯, whereas sSOE = 0 when w ≥ w¯. Thus, (15)
has to be modified to LY (t) = LIY if AY (t) < w¯/p¯ (early stage of development) and
LY (t) = L
II
Y in a later stage of development, i.e., structural change eventually occurs
in the process of development if initial productivity ΨI0 < w¯/p¯. Most importantly,
Propositions 9-11 hold under the modifications of this appendix. As the equilibrium
land price, π = ABX − w¯, is equal to the willingness to pay of big landowners, they
don’t get any rent from acquiring land in economic equilibrium. This implies that
their policy preferences towards public investment G remain unaﬀected under either
trade regime.
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Figure 1: Illustration of part (a) of Proposition 5. 
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Figure 2: Saddle path equilibrium in an open and democratic economy if 0=θ . 
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Figure 3: Development path in an open and democratic economy if 0θ > , 
characterized by structural change from Regime I to Regime II. 
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Figure 4: Phase diagram in a closed economy under either political system (Cobb-
Douglas utility). 
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 1878-1882 1898-1902 
 Primary % Secondary % Primary % Secondary % 
Argentina Wool 56 Hides 31 Wool 35 Wheat 23 
Uruguay Hides 44 Wool 30 Wool 40 Hides 32 
Brazil Coffee 70 Sugar 16 Coffee 65 Rubber 26 
Chile Copper 68 Nitrate 32 Nitrate 81 Copper 19 
Colombia Tobacco 61 Coffee 39 Coffee 92 Tobacco 8 
Mexico Silver 92 Coffee 7 Silver 75 Copper 11 
Peru Sugar 48 Silver 26 Sugar 32 Silver 23 
 
 
 1920-1924 1934-1938 
 Primary % Secondary % Primary % Secondary % 
Argentina Wheat 31 Maize 20 Maize 25 Meat 22 
Uruguay Meat 41 Wool 39 Wool 54 Meat 31 
Brazil Coffee 83 Sugar 6 Coffee 68 Cotton 24 
Chile Nitrate 75 Copper 25 Copper 62 Nitrate 38 
Colombia Coffee 98 Tobacco 2 Coffee 74 Petroleum 26 
Mexico Petroleum 69 Silver 16 Silver 31 Petroleum 31 
Peru Sugar 31 Cotton 28 Petroleum 40 Cotton 27 
 
 
Table 1: Major exports in Latin America around 1900. 
Source: Blattman, Hwang and Williamson (2003, Tab. 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Exports/GDP Annual Change 
 1870 1913 1870-1913 
France 4.9 7.8 2.8 
Germany 9.5 16.1 4.1 
Netherlands 17.4 17.3 2.3 
UK  12.2 17.5 2.8 
    
Argentina  - - 5.2 a  
Brazil 12.2 9.8 1.9 
Chile  - - 3.4 
Columbia - - 2.0 
Mexico 3.9 9.1 5.4 b  
Peru - -  
    
Canada - - 4.1 
US 2.5 3.7 4.9 
 
 
Table 2: Merchandise exports around 1900 as percent of GDP and annual 
average growth rate of volume. New world and European industrial core. 
Source: Maddison (2000, Tab. 3-10, F-5) 
a 1877-1912,  b 1877/8-1910/1 
